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TRIPS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: A CASE 
FOR JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY 
INTRODUCTION 
omplaints of weak intellectual property right (“IPR”) enforcement 
in China are legion. This widespread criticism is understandable in 
light of the immense scale of the problem. For example, in 2005 the U.S. 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) proclaimed that IPR infringement rates 
in China had been estimated at over ninety percent “for virtually every 
form of intellectual property.”1 Over eighty percent of all IPR infringing 
products seized at the U.S. border in 2006 came from China.2 These fig-
ures persist in spite of China’s membership in the World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”).3 TRIPS members are expected to meet cer-
tain minimum standards of IPR protection.4 If a member violates these 
standards, other members may bring a case to the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body (“DSB”) to demand compliance of the offending member.5 
After several years of threats and harsh rhetoric,6 on April 10, 2007, the 
                                                                                                             
 1. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_
301/asset_upload_file195_7636.pdf [hereinafter 2005 SPECIAL REPORT]. 
 2. USTR, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 18, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ 
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_ 
file230_11122.pdf [hereinafter 2007 SPECIAL REPORT]. 
 3. See WTO Membership–In Brief, Dec. 11, 2005, available at http://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Membership]. 
 4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs [hereinafter TRIPS] 
(“Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive pro-
tection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contra-
vene the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See, e.g., Rick Valliere, U.S. Continues to Press China for Stricter Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 72 No. 1788, Oct. 
6, 2006 (“Christian Israel, deputy assistant secretary for technology policy at the Depart-
ment of Commerce, said that bringing a first intellectual property case against China 
under the World Trade Organization is ‘under serious consideration.’”); Kathleen E. 
McLaughlin, EU Trade Chief Warns China Failure to Meet IPR, WTO Commitments 
May Spark Backlash, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 72 No. 1774, June 16, 
2006 (“Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Tim Stratford told a commission in Washing-
ton that a WTO case against China over IPR is ‘very possible.’ Stratford said the U.S. 
government is laying the foundation for a formal complaint with the trade body.”); Chris-
topher S. Rugaber, USTR Cites Russia, China for IPR Violations, but Avoids Punitive 
Action, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 72 No. 1768, May 5, 2006 (“[T]he USTR 
C 
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USTR7 finally initiated action in the WTO against China based on its 
unsatisfactory IPR enforcement record.8 The case alleges failure to meet 
                                                                                                             
will ‘step up consideration of its WTO dispute settlement options’ . . . .”); 2005 SPECIAL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (“The United States remains gravely concerned . . . that 
China has not resolved critical deficiencies in IPR protection and enforcement and, as a 
result infringement remains at epidemic levels.”); US, Switzerland, Japan Launch New 
WTO Probe On China’s IP Enforcement, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 26, 2005, 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=120 [hereinafter New WTO Probe] (“Dur-
ing the 25 October TRIPS Council meeting, China was accused of continued ‘rampant’ 
piracy and counterfeiting . . . .”); Andrew Yeh & Christopher S. Rugaber, China Says 
IPR Crackdown Under Way; Aldonas to Press China on Enforcement, PAT., TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT J., vol. 68 No. 1687, Sept. 17, 2004 (“China’s failure to enforce its IPR 
laws ‘is something that would amount to a violation of their WTO obligations and they 
do need to pick up the pace in terms of reform.’”); USTR, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 
SECTION 306, at 10, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_ 
Publications/2003/2003_Special_301_Report/Special_301_Report_Section_306.html 
(“The lack of transparency and coordination among Chinese government agencies, local 
protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for criminal prosecution, lack of training 
and weak punishments all hamper enforcement of IPR.”). 
 7. The USTR is “a Cabinet member who serves as the president’s principal trade 
advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade issues.” Office of the USTR, Mission of 
the USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html. It is the 
USTR’s responsibility to monitor and enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements, which 
includes taking action in the dispute settlement system of the WTO. USTR, 2006 
ANNUAL REPORT 219 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Trade_Policy_Agenda/asset_upload_file922_9075.pdf. 
 8. Office of the USTR, Press Release, United States Files WTO Cases Against 
China Over Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws and Market Access 
Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries (Apr. 9, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/April/United_States_Files_WTO_Cases_Again 
st_China_Over_Deficiencies_in_Chinas_Intellectual_Property_Rights_Laws_Market_Ac
cess_Barr_printer.html [hereinafter U.S. Announcement] (“U.S. Trade Representative 
Susan C. Schwab announced today that the United States will make two requests tomor-
row for [WTO] dispute settlement consultations with the People’s Republic of China: one 
over deficiencies in China’s legal regime for protecting and enforcing copyrights and 
trademarks on a wide range of products . . . .”). USTR Schwab commented: 
Piracy and counterfeiting levels in China remain unacceptably high . . . . Inade-
quate protection of intellectual property rights in China costs U.S. firms and 
workers billions of dollars each year . . . . [W]hile the United States and China 
have been able to work cooperatively and pragmatically on a range of IPR is-
sues, and China has taken numerous steps to improve its protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights, we have not been able to agree on 
several important changes to China’s legal regime that we believe are required 
by China’s WTO commitments. 
Id. The U.S. request for consultations focused on four specific areas of concern: “Thresh-
olds for Criminal Liability,” “Disposal of Infringing Goods,” “Denial of Copyright Pro-
tection to Works Awaiting Censorship Review,” and “Scope of Criminal Law on Piracy.” 
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TRIPS enforcement standards with respect to certain aspects of China’s 
criminal law and certain Chinese provisions for disposal of infringing 
products by customs authorities.9 
The delay in U.S. action against China may reflect uncertainty in adju-
dicating a TRIPS enforcement claim before the DSB.10 Another explana-
tion for the deferral of a WTO case is that the United States first gave 
bilateral negotiations with China an opportunity to resolve enforcement 
issues.11 More crucial to U.S. hesitance, perhaps, were the practical bar-
riers to effective DSB resolution of TRIPS enforcement claims, includ-
ing: the limited type of claims that may be heard, the vagueness of the 
TRIPS enforcement standard, a potentially high standard of proof, and 
deference to decisions of national resource allocation.12 These impedi-
ments certainly justified pause in pursuing a WTO case that could have 
negative diplomatic implications,13 and they may still limit the strength 
                                                                                                             
Office of the USTR, Trade Delivers, Real Results–April 2007, WTO Case Challenging 
Weaknesses in China’s Legal Regime for Protection and Enforcement of Copyrights and 
Trademarks, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/ 
2007/asset_upload_file908_11061.pdf [hereinafter Request for Consultations]. For gen-
eral information and documents related to this case, see WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dis-
pute DS362, China–Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm. 
 9. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 10. There have been only four TRIPS enforcement cases to date, all of which were 
settled by mutually agreed solution and thus did not reach DSB panels. See Mutually-
Agreed Solution, Greece–Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pic-
tures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/2 (Mar. 26, 2001); Mutually-Agreed Solu-
tion, European Communities–Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion 
Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS124/2 (Mar. 26, 2001); Mutually-Agreed So-
lution, Sweden–Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS86/2 (Dec. 11, 1998); Mutually-Agreed Solution, Denmark–Measures Affecting 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS83/2 (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Enforcement Cases]. See also WTO, Index of Disputes Issues, http://www.wto. 
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#trips_enforcement [hereinafter 
Index of Disputes]. 
 11. See U.S. Announcement, supra note 8 (“Because bilateral dialogue has not re-
solved our concerns, we are taking the next step by requesting WTO consultations.”). 
 12. See infra, Part III.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellec-
tual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 944, 946 (2006) [hereinafter 
Yu, Post-WTO China] (“[A] formal WTO complaint will strain the bilateral relationship 
between China and the United States, regardless of who wins at the end. . . . A weak case 
before the WTO will not only be unhelpful in liberating trade, but could potentially back-
fire on the entire international community. Pursuing such a case is worse than not bring-
ing the case at all.”); IP Enforcement in China, a Potential WTO Case, and U.S.-China 
Relations: Hearing on Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit 
Goods Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm’n 8 (June 8, 2006) (statement 
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of the pending U.S. case. Even a favorable DSB decision may not pro-
vide the breadth and depth of overall improvement in IPR enforcement 
that the United States seeks.14 
A direct attack on China’s implementing enforcement provisions is not 
the only path for challenging China’s IPR enforcement, and it does not 
address all of China’s weaknesses related to IPR enforcement. China has 
implemented the substantive provisions of TRIPS in its domestic law,15 
which private right holders may use to bring claims in local dispute reso-
lution settings.16 Civil litigation is an important method for resolving IPR 
                                                                                                             
of Justin Hughes, Professor, Cardozo School of Law) [hereinafter Hughes Statement] 
(“[W]e now face the problem of a case against one of our principal trading partners, a 
case that, if it goes badly, could damage the WTO as well as what is now the globe’s 
most important bilateral relationship. The folks at the USTR and the rest of the Executive 
branch are well aware of this; if it seems they are moving quite cautiously, they have 
good reason.”). The position of the USTR is that the dual approaches of WTO dispute 
settlement and cooperative efforts, such as the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Com-
merce and Trade, complement each other. Request for Consultations, supra note 8. 
 14. The U.S. case only addresses criminal enforcement of IPRs and destruction of 
infringing goods by customs authorities; thus it ignores inadequate civil recourse in China 
for patent infringement and cases of copyright and trademark infringement that are below 
criminal thresholds. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. In addition, the TRIPS 
preamble provides that “the provision of effective and appropriate means for the en-
forcement of trade-related intellectual property rights [should] tak[e] into account differ-
ences in national legal systems.” TRIPS pmbl. Cf. Sol Picciotto, Private Rights vs. Public 
Standards in the WTO for a Margin of Appreciation in the Interpretation of the WTO 
Agreements 3 (Paper Presented at the International Conference: Beyond the Washington 
Consensus—Governance and the Public Domain in Contrasting Economies: The Cases of 
India and Canada, Feb. 12–14, 2001), available at http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/SPiciotto.PDF 
(proposing the application of the “margin of appreciation” standard that has been devel-
oped in European human rights law to WTO obligations). The principle of granting some 
amount of deference to national legal systems, when combined with a fuzzy standard for 
enforcement in Article 41(1) of TRIPS, see infra note 181 and accompanying text, may 
lead the DSB to hold China accountable to a level of IPR enforcement that falls short of 
expectations. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Mart Leesti & Tom Pengelly, Institutional Issues for Developing Countries in 
Intellectual Property Policymaking, Administration & Enforcement (Comm’n on Intellec-
tual Prop. Rights, Study Paper 9), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/ 
pdfs/study_papers/sp9_pengelly_study.pdf. 
[A]s articulated in the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, “. . . intellectual 
property rights are private rights.” The impact of this concept is that IPR re-
gimes should lean heavily towards supporting the resolution of disputes arising 
over intellectual property assets between parties under civil law and so reduce 
the enforcement burden on the state to the minimum. 
Id. at 17. 
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disputes in western countries,17 and China has taken steps to promote its 
courts as a desirable forum for bringing IPR claims.18 Problems with 
China’s judicial system, however, impede potential litigants.19 
Corruption, local protectionism, and political influence undermine the 
judicial system in China.20 TRIPS enforcement provisions include proce-
dures for ensuring “fair and equitable” judicial resolution of disputes,21 
but a challenge to China’s compliance with these procedures would en-
counter the same difficulties as the current U.S. case.22 An alternative 
approach, or at least a parallel objective, should be to focus on China’s 
compliance with the transparency provisions in Article 63(1) of TRIPS—
specifically, the requirement to publish certain judicial decisions.23 
China’s judicial decision-making remains opaque, as few written opin-
ions are published, and even fewer reach the public unaltered by China’s 
highest court.24 If the United States were to challenge China in the DSB 
on Article 63(1) transparency, a reasonable interpretation and application 
of that provision should find China not in conformity. A more transpar-
ent judicial system in China would create a fair and predictable environ-
ment for private litigants to protect their rights, which would improve 
overall IPR enforcement.25 
                                                                                                             
 17. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 212 (2002). 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See DELI YANG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 213–
216 (2003) [hereinafter YANG, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA]. A survey of thirty-five com-
panies with business in China concluded that litigation was the least preferred strategy of 
resolving IP-related issues. Id. An important factor in deterring companies from litigation 
in China was inadequacy of judicial enforcement. Id. 
 20. See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 214–217, 225–227 (2001). 
 21. TRIPS art. 42 (“Members shall make available to right holders civil judicial pro-
cedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by this 
Agreement.”) (footnote omitted). See also TRIPS art. 41(2) (“Procedures concerning the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable.”). 
 22. See infra Part III.C. 
 23. TRIPS art. 63(1). 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. Transparency in governmental operations is a critical factor for foreign investors 
because it reduces uncertainty and suppresses corruption. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC 
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR TRANSPARENCY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTOR 8 (2003). In China, the lack of transparency in intellectual 
property enforcement systems has inhibited IPR holders. See CHOW, supra note 17, at 
212–213. Greater transparency in the Chinese judiciary would encourage more foreign 
technology-based investment in China, and would lead those investors to seek IPR en-
forcement through civil litigation. 
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Part I of this Note describes certain TRIPS provisions, including those 
related to enforcement of IPRs. Part II discusses IPR protection in China 
under the TRIPS agreement, which is affected by Chinese legal culture. 
Part III explores adjudication before the DSB as a path for achieving im-
proved IPR enforcement in China by analyzing the efficacy of the cur-
rent U.S. case. It concludes that TRIPS limits its members’ capacity to 
directly improve IPR enforcement among other members, specifically 
China, through the DSB. Part IV recognizes that private right owners are 
ultimately responsible for enforcing their rights in China, but are limited 
by the shortcomings of the domestic judicial system. Thus, Part IV pro-
poses a solution for better enforcement that focuses on improved trans-
parency, based on Article 63(1) of TRIPS, for effecting change in 
China’s judicial system. 
I. TRIPS 
A. TRIPS Objectives and Principles 
TRIPS establishes a set of minimum standards for IPR protection 
among members.26 The central theme of TRIPS is to create a system of 
rights creation and protection that reflects Western standards, but with 
enough flexibility for developing nations with limited institutional capac-
ity to adhere to the agreement.27 TRIPS allows developed countries to 
collect “technology rents” for their intellectual property in the develop-
ing world,28 but also strives to help developing countries acquire and in-
tegrate new technologies through foreign investment, which is called 
                                                                                                             
 26. Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “The Customary Rules of Interpretation of 
Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (2006) 
(“A feature of the TRIPS Agreement that affects its interpretation is its nature as an 
agreement of minimum standards that aims to have a certain level of intellectual property 
protection across all WTO members. It is a ‘low-level’ harmonization agreement, and 
provides minimum standards for protection of intellectual property rights, which may be 
implemented in different ways at the domestic level.”). 
 27. See TRIPS pmbl. (recognizing the need for “the provision of effective and appro-
priate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into 
account differences in national legal systems,” and “the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic imple-
mentation of laws and regulations”). 
 28. Technology rents are capital returns for intellectual property producers who li-
cense to or extract payment from intellectual property users, provided the existence of 
intellectual property rights. See Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective 
Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multi-
lateralism, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 80 (2005) [hereinafter Abbott, Toward a New Era]. 
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technology transfer.29 There is a specific requirement in TRIPS to ensure 
technology flows from developed countries to the least-developed coun-
tries.30 But even without an express requirement for technology transfer 
to the other developing countries, there is a general theory that intellec-
tual property protection stimulates acquisition of new technologies, so 
long as there are appropriate controls to govern such activity.31 
Private businesses may follow several different modes of foreign in-
vestment that introduce new technology to a developing country. A basic 
example is the selling of goods in the country.32 Goods that contain use-
ful technology can be studied and reverse engineered.33 A company may 
take it one step further and license technology to a foreign entity for 
manufacture and sale within the country.34 If a company wants to main-
tain greater control over technology being manufactured in the country, it 
may become a multinational enterprise by gaining a total or partial stake 
in a foreign entity and license the technology to that entity.35 Foreign 
investors may also open research and development facilities abroad to 
create new technology.36 In each case, the state of IPR protection is a 
critical factor in deciding whether to invest and in the investment strat-
egy.37 
                                                                                                             
 29. See TRIPS art. 7. 
  The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should con-
tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dis-
semination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Id. 
 30. TRIPS art. 66(2) (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enter-
prises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create 
a sound and viable technological base.”). China is not considered a least-developed coun-
try. See WTO Membership, supra note 3. 
 31. See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 24–26 (2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. For a range of 
perspectives on this theory, see WIPO-WTO Joint Workshop: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Transfer of Technology, available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/ 
meetings/2003/wipo_wto/wipo_wto_03_program.html. 
 32. CHOW, supra note 17, at 31. 
 33. Keith E. Maskus, Using the International Trading System to Foster Technology 
Transfer for Economic Development, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 219, 230. 
 34. CHOW, supra note 17, at 32. 
 35. Id. at 34–35. 
 36. Id. at 35–36. 
 37. See id. at 6–7. 
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B. TRIPS Provisions 
1. Substantive Rights 
Part II of TRIPS sets forth the substantive rights to be protected. 
TRIPS negotiators found it practical to rely on existing international in-
tellectual property standards.38 Therefore, TRIPS incorporates the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967), the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971), and 
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits 
(1989) into the main body of protected rights.39 It would have been infea-
sible not to include these agreements because they were entrenched in 
legal institutions and industry practice.40 TRIPS also added some new 
rights, including provisions related to rental rights, trademarks, service 
marks, and geographical indications.41 Although these additions ex-
panded the field of international intellectual property, the distinguishing 
feature of TRIPS is the inclusion of enforcement provisions.42 There was 
a pressing need for such a system of enforceable rights, the lack of which 
was the main failure of the “Paris-Berne” system.43 
2. Enforcement Procedures 
Part III of TRIPS contains provisions related to the enforcement of the 
rights enumerated in Part II of the agreement. Article 41 outlines general 
enforcement obligations, including, in paragraph 1, that “Members shall 
ensure that enforcement procedures . . . are available under their law so 
as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellec-
                                                                                                             
 38. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
68 (2d ed. 2003). 
 39. Id. at 69. TRIPS references the 1967 Paris Convention and the 1971 Berne Con-
vention, TRIPS n.2, although the original conventions were adopted in 1883 and 1886, 
respectively. WIPO-Administered Treaties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en. The Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits was adopted in 1989, TRIPS 
n.2, but never entered into force. GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 69. 
 40. GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 68. 
 41. Id. at 69. 
 42. Id. (“There was no precedent for this in the field of intellectual property at the 
multilateral level.”). 
 43. See Jose Felgueroso, TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Understanding: The First 
Six Years, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 165, 171–172 (2002). (“[T]he international system of intellec-
tual property rights instituted by the Paris and Berne Conventions, and administered by 
the WIPO, was fragmented and unenforceable. . . . In contrast, through the WTO, any 
Member State may bring a complaint before an international trade panel to enforce rights 
and obligations recognized in the TRIPs Agreement.”). 
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tual property rights.”44 Paragraph 5 of Article 41 qualifies this standard 
for enforcement because it excuses members from creating a distinct ju-
dicial system for IPR cases, upgrading law enforcement capability, or 
devoting more resources to IPR enforcement than any other type of law 
enforcement.45 The freedom of resource allocation seems to undermine 
effective enforcement, especially in member countries with weak overall 
law enforcement. According to one scholar, however, there is no excuse 
for failing to meet TRIPS enforcement obligations if no increase in re-
sources is needed.46 But the degree to which a member must exercise its 
enforcement procedures in light of Article 41(5), if any, remains ques-
tionable. 
There are civil and criminal procedures and remedies for violations.47 
On the civil side, TRIPS allows for a dual system of judicial and admin-
istrative decision-making.48 Articles 42–49 include basic requirements 
for judicial and administrative systems, such as the right to notice of 
claim, representation by independent legal counsel, standards of evi-
dence, and remedies such as injunctions.49 TRIPS also requires that ad-
ministrative decisions be subject to judicial review, and that litigants 
have the opportunity for appeal from initial judicial decisions, at least on 
questions of law.50 
The required criminal procedures are in Article 61, which applies to 
“wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale.”51 Regarding other cases of infringement, there are no criminal 
enforcement requirements.52 But members have the option to “provide 
for criminal procedures and penalties . . . in other cases . . . in particular 
where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.”53 If a 
                                                                                                             
 44. TRIPS art. 41(1) (emphasis added). 
 45. TRIPS art. 41(5). 
[T]his Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the en-
forcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to en-
force their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with re-
spect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and the enforcement of law in general. 
Id. 
 46. GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 289. 
 47. TRIPS Part III, §§ 2, 5. 
 48. TRIPS arts. 42, 49. 
 49. TRIPS arts. 42–49. 
 50. TRIPS art. 41(4). 
 51. TRIPS art. 61. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
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member does not adopt criminal procedures that apply to any “other 
cases,” then cases of patent infringement and trademark and copyright 
infringement not deemed to be on a commercial scale are not subject to 
criminal prosecution.54 Private right owners have sole responsibility for 
taking action in such cases. 
3. Transparency 
TRIPS continues the theme of transparent compliance with treaty obli-
gations that lies at the heart of WTO agreements.55 Article 63 includes 
several provisions that require making domestic intellectual property 
laws and decisions publicly available to right owners, notifying laws to 
the Council for TRIPS for review,56 and providing members with infor-
mation on certain cases of interest.57 Specifically, Article 63(1) states in 
part: 
Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administra-
tive rulings of general application, made effective by a Member per-
taining to the subject matter of this Agreement (the availability, scope, 
acquisition, enforcement and prevention of the abuse of intellectual 
property rights) shall be published . . . in such a manner as to enable 
governments and right holders to become acquainted with them.58 
The procedure to make laws and regulations publicly available is by noti-
fication as provided for in Article 63(2).59 Article 63 offers no specific 
procedure for publishing “final judicial decisions and administrative rul-
ings of general application.”60 As such, it is not exactly clear what is re-
                                                                                                             
 54. See id. 
 55. See Jiangyu Wang, The Rule of Law in China: A Realistic View of the Jurispru-
dence, the Impact of the WTO, and the Prospects for Future Development, 2004 SING. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 347, 380 (2004) (“Transparency is one of the pillar principles of the WTO, 
underpinning all substantive areas of the multilateral trading system.”). See also Working 
Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Communication from the 
European Community and its Member States: Concept Paper on Transparency, para. 3, 
WT/WGTI/W/110 (Mar. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Transparency Paper] (“Ministers of 
WTO Members have recognised ‘. . . the case for a multilateral framework to secure 
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross border investment, par-
ticularly [Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)] . . . .’ The reason is that greater transparency 
encourages higher flows of FDI . . . .”) (omissions to quotation in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
 56. The Council for TRIPS is charged with monitoring members’ compliance with 
TRIPS obligations. TRIPS art. 68. 
 57. TRIPS arts. 63(1)–63(3). 
 58. TRIPS art. 63(1) (emphasis added). 
 59. GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 335. 
 60. See TRIPS art. 63. 
2007] TRIPS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 319 
quired for members to comply with this clause. Notification of laws and 
regulations can only confirm nominal compliance with TRIPS stan-
dards.61 Publication of judicial decisions, however, makes transparent the 
application of substantive law during litigation,62 which in turn reveals 
how effective civil enforcement is in practice.63 This aspect of transpar-
ency should not be discounted in any application of Article 63(1). 
C. WTO Dispute Settlement 
Article 64(1) grants members access to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, as defined in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes,64 for disputes arising under 
TRIPS.65 This mechanism, referred to as the Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”),66 allows a member to bring a complaint against another mem-
ber.67 The first step in bringing a complaint is to submit a request for 
consultation to another member68 and to notify this action to the DSB.69 
The request must identify the legal basis for the complaint.70 A mutually 
agreed solution is the preferred outcome,71 but if the consulting parties 
cannot settle the dispute within specified time limits, the complaining 
                                                                                                             
 61. See J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 339 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman, Enforcing the Enforce-
ment Procedures] (“[A]dopting legislation that complies with international minimum 
standards becomes only the starting point. States must further apply these laws in ways 
that will stand up to external scrutiny . . . then they must adequately enforce them in 
compliance with detailed criteria concerning procedural and administrative matters . . . .”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 62. See Transparency Paper, supra note 55, at para. 11 (“Lack of transparency . . . is 
not only a problem concerning the legislation and rules . . . but is often related to the 
application of the rules.”). 
 63. See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China’s Judicial Reform, 4 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255, 309 (2003) (“[A]llowing the public to see how a court 
reaches its decision ultimately results in greater fairness of the judicial process and in-
creases the public’s trust in the system.”). 
 64. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm [hereinafter DSU]. 
 65. TRIPS art. 64(1). 
 66. DSU art. 2(1). 
 67. DSU art. 2(1). 
 68. See YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 39 (2005). 
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. Id. 
 71. DSU art. 3(7). 
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party may request that a DSB panel be established.72 The U.S. case 
against China reached this impasse during consultations in early June 
2007, and on August 13, 2007 the United States requested the formation 
of a DSB panel.73 
A DSB panel is composed of three panelists appointed by the parties,74 
and is only allowed to review claims within its terms of reference, which 
are the relevant provisions the parties agree upon.75 The goal of the panel 
is to produce a report that includes “the findings of fact, the applicability 
of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind any findings and 
recommendations that it makes.”76 The DSB established a panel in the 
U.S.-China case on September 25, 2007, and the panel will make its re-
port available in late 2008.77 
A party to the dispute may appeal the panel report to the Appellate 
Body, a standing body of the DSB with expertise in international trade 
law.78 An appeal is limited to issues of law addressed by the DSB 
panel,79 and the Appellate Body has unqualified authority to “uphold, 
                                                                                                             
 72. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 41. 
 73. Office of the USTR, Press Release, United States Requests WTO Panel in Case 
Challenging Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws (Aug. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/August/United 
_States_Requests_WTO_Panel_in_Case_Challenging_Deficiencies_in_Chinas_Intellectu
al_Property_Rights_Laws_printer.html. The request alleges three areas where Chinese 
measures are inconsistent with TRIPS: (1) “Thresholds for criminal procedures and pen-
alties,” (2) “Disposal of goods confiscated by Customs Authorities that infringe Intellec-
tual Property Rights,” and (3) “Denial of copyright and related rights protection and en-
forcement to works that have not been authorized for publication or distribution within 
China.” Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China–Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/7 
(Aug. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Request for a Panel]. A fourth area of contention—the scope 
of criminal procedures—that was originally included in the request for consultations was 
excluded from this request to establish a panel. See Request for Consultations, supra note 
8. The likely reason for the exclusion of this issue was that it was resolved during consul-
tation. See id. (“China published a Judicial Interpretation April 7 that may be designed to 
address this problem. The United States would welcome this development and plans to 
discuss the new Judicial Interpretation with China during WTO consultations.”). 
 74. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 86, 88. 
 75. Id. at 74. 
 76. DSU art. 12(7). 
 77. Paul Garwood, WTO Inquiry Launched into U.S. Complaints Against China’s IP 
Record, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index. 
php?p=758. China refused the first U.S. request to establish a panel, but under WTO rules 
the panel was automatically established upon a second request. Id. 
 78. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 195. 
 79. DSU art. 17(6). 
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modify or reverse” the panel’s legal conclusions on those issues.80 If a 
panel or the Appellate Body finds a particular measure is inconsistent 
with a member’s treaty obligations, it must recommend that the DSB 
request the offending member to remedy the inconsistency.81 The coer-
cive element to such a request is the threat of trade sanctions, which the 
DSB may grant if the losing party to a dispute does not implement a re-
port.82 
There are normally three types of complaints that may be brought to 
the DSB: violation complaints; non-violation complaints; and situation 
complaints.83 Complaints under TRIPS, however, are restricted to viola-
tion complaints because there is disagreement as to the impact of allow-
ing non-violation complaints or situation complaints.84 Outside of 
                                                                                                             
 80. DSU art. 17(13). 
 81. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 223. 
 82. Felgueroso, supra note 43, at 178–180. During TRIPS negotiations, there was 
debate over whether to bring TRIPS under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, or to 
create a separate mechanism for TRIPS. See GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 22. Because 
TRIPS does provide access to the DSB, members can seek retaliatory measures, such as 
trade sanctions, in other areas of trade for failure to meet TRIPS obligations. DSU art. 
22(3). 
 83. The DSU incorporates these three grounds for a complaint by referencing Article 
XXIII of GATT. DSU art. 3(1). There is a basis for a complaint 
[i]f any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly 
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the at-
tainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations 
under this Agreement, or 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
(c) the existence of any other situation 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The types of complaints provided for in paragraphs 
(a), (b), and (c) are referred to as violation, non-violation, and situation complaints, re-
spectively. See, e.g., Debra P. Steger, The Jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization, 
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 142, 143 (2004). 
 84. See TRIPS art. 64(2) (“Subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 
1994 shall not apply to the settlement of disputes under this Agreement for a period of 
five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.”). The moratorium 
on non-violation complaints has been extended indefinitely. See Council for TRIPS, 
Minutes of Meeting, para. 89, IP/C/M/54 (July 26, 2007) (“[T]he TRIPS Council [will] 
continue its examination of the scope and modalities for complaints of the types provided 
for under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 . . . . It was agreed 
that in the meantime, Members would not initiate such complaints under the TRIPS 
322 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
TRIPS, non-violation complaints may target any measure taken by a 
member that thwarts the expected benefits of an agreement, regardless of 
whether a measure directly conflicts with a particular provision in the 
agreement.85 Non-violation complaints thus allow for much broader at-
tacks than violation complaints, which are only useful for challenging 
particular implementations of, or failures to implement, specific provi-
sions.86 Situation complaints a fortiori allow for even broader attacks 
than non-violation complaints. The bar against non-violation and situa-
tion complaints narrows the ability to enforce TRIPS obligations by con-
fining challenges to the text of the agreement. 
II. CHINESE IPR PROTECTION UNDER TRIPS 
A. China’s Brief History in the WTO 
China acceded to the WTO on December 11, 2001 after 15 years of 
negotiations.87 China’s accession protocol mandated membership in 
TRIPS and the other multilateral WTO agreements.88 The developed na-
tions that controlled the agenda of the Uruguay Round,89 the United 
States, the European Communities, Japan, and Switzerland, negotiated 
TRIPS mainly as a way to collect technology rents, although ostensibly 
they aimed to benefit developing countries.90 China’s accession to the 
WTO was, in some opinions, yet another opportunity for these developed 
countries to protect economic interests by exerting more influence over 
                                                                                                             
Agreement.”). Situation complaints have never been brought before the DSB, and never 
was there such a case under GATT. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 315. This 
particular category seems to provide a fallback for a complaint that does not fit into the 
other two categories of complaints. See id. 
 85. See YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 308. 
 86. See GATT art. XXIII(1)(a). 
 87. WTO Membership, supra note 3. 
 88. See WTO, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, pt. I, § 1(3), WT/L/432 
(Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession]. 
 89. This round of multilateral negotiations created the WTO, including the TRIPS 
agreement. Nathan E. Stacy, The Efficacy and Fairness of Current Sanctions in Effecting 
Stronger Patent Rights in Developing Countries, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 271 
(2004). 
 90. See Abbott, Toward a New Era, supra note 28, at 80–81. See also Frederick M. 
Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS 
Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 166–167 (2000); cf. SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE 
POWER, PUBLIC LAW 8 (2003) (“The TRIPS process was far more complex than a state-
centric account would lead us to believe. In the TRIPS case, private actors pursued their 
interests through multiple channels and struck bargains with multiple actors . . . .”). 
2007] TRIPS ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 323 
China’s legal system.91 China, however, has maintained that it will still 
benefit from TRIPS-based IPR protections.92 
Some critics doubt that a strong Western-style IPR regime is essential 
for driving technology transfer to developing countries.93 For instance, 
many developed countries, including the United States, first relied on 
intellectual property appropriation for economic growth before institut-
ing intellectual property protections.94 Indeed, China’s economic surge 
has relied on appropriation of technology, rather than protection of tech-
nology.95 Nevertheless, China accepts the premise that it must increase 
IPR protection to become a fully developed country.96 Tian Lipu, the 
commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s 
                                                                                                             
 91. See Peerenboom, supra note 20, at 249. 
 92. See STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
[SIPO], CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN 2005, available at http://www. 
sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/ndbg/bps/200605/t20060509_99488.htm [hereinafter SIPO 
2005]. 
 93. See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 28 
(2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPR_Exec_ 
Sumfinal.pdf. See also Maskus, supra note 33, at 223; Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO 
TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385, 391 
(1996) (“The arguments suggesting that higher levels of IPRs protection will benefit the 
developing countries are logical. They may in small or large part be correct. But the train 
of logic is not supported by empirical evidence.”). 
 94. See Steve Lohr, New Economy; The Intellectual Property Debate Takes a Page 
From 19th-Century America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at C4. 
[T]he economies that were shining success stories of development, from the 
United States in the 19th century to Japan and its East Asian neighbors like 
Taiwan and South Korea in the 20th, took off under systems of weak intellec-
tual property protection. Technology transfer came easily and inexpensively 
until domestic skills and local industries were advanced enough that stronger 
intellectual property protections became a matter of self-interest. 
  But according to the recent report [by the Commission on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights], this kind of economic-development tactic—copying to jump-start 
an industry—is endangered by the United States-led push for stronger intellec-
tual property rights worldwide. 
Id. 
 95. Abbott, Toward a New Era, supra note 28, at 81–82. 
 96. See SIPO 2005, supra note 92; STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE, NEW 
PROGRESS IN CHINA’S PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2005), available 
at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Apr/126297.htm. See also Deming Liu, Now the 
Wolf Has Indeed Come! Perspective on the Patent Protection of Biotechnology Inven-
tions in China, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 237–238 (2005). 
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Republic of China (“SIPO”), recognizes the need for China to transition 
from “made in China” to “invented in China.”97 
Since China has become a member of TRIPS, there has been a large 
increase in the number of U.S. and other foreign businesses applying for 
patent protection in China.98 There has also been a great increase in the 
number of Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”) applications from China 
to the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).99 These are 
signs that China is moving toward a technology-based economy. This 
progress may not continue, however, if technology investors find China 
to be an inhospitable environment for defending their rights.100 
B. Compliance with TRIPS Provisions 
As part of its obligations of becoming a member, China was required 
to amend its patent, copyright, and trademark law to be in compliance 
with TRIPS.101 The transitional review mechanism required notification 
of laws and regulations to the Council for TRIPS.102 The Council also 
                                                                                                             
 97. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Chinese IP Official Says Country is Working to Protect 
Ideas and Brands, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 71 No. 1758, Feb. 24, 2006. 
Tian Lipu was responding to an interviewer’s characterization of China as the “world’s 
factory.” Id. Toward moving beyond this status, he said that “China has not only estab-
lished a complete intellectual property legal regime and a law enforcement framework 
that are in conformity with international practice, but also an effective IPR protection 
mechanism.” Id. (the quoted interview is available at http://english.gov.cn/chinatoday/ft/ 
060208_interview.htm). 
 98. Patent Applications Increase, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 29, 2006, available at http:// 
www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/179386.htm. 
 99. Daniel Pruzin, International Patent Applications Up in 2005, Sparked by East 
Asia, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., vol. 71 No. 1756, Feb. 10, 2006. Applications 
received from China (and Hong Kong) increased by 43.7 percent in 2005. Id. PCT appli-
cations do not provide any enforceable protection, but provide developing countries a 
means to process patent applications. Applications are filed with a national patent office 
or with WIPO and are then examined for patentability in one of several examining of-
fices. WIPO, Summary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (1970), http://www.wipo. 
int/treaties/en/registration/pct/summary_pct.html. Based on an opinion of patentability 
from the examining office, an applicant may decide to seek an actual patent in any PCT 
contracting country. Id. Developing countries without sufficient resources to examine 
patents may rely on the PCT opinion in deciding whether to grant a patent. See id. 
 100. See Wayne M. Morrison, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: 
China-U.S. Trade Issues 21 (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/ 
other/RL33536.pdf [hereinafter Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues] (“Many observers 
contend that, without a solid IPR enforcement regime, innovation and growth of IPR-
related industries in China will likely be greatly retarded.”). 
 101. Accession, supra note 88, Annex 1A § VI(a). 
 102. TRIPS art. 63(2). There is a transitional review mechanism in place that uses 
question checklists relating to each area of intellectual property. The member being re-
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provided a separate checklist of questions for China to answer to ensure 
that enforcement laws and practices were in compliance with Part III of 
TRIPS.103 The transitional review of China is not complete,104 but to date 
China’s laws are generally in compliance with substantive TRIPS provi-
sions.105 The United States, however, remains dissatisfied with China’s 
implementation of Article 61, relating to criminal procedures and reme-
dies.106 
In December 2004, China issued a judicial interpretation that lowered 
thresholds for criminal liability.107 Despite this move, the United States 
still claimed the Chinese thresholds for criminal liability were too high 
and thus under-inclusive of activity that should be deemed criminal.108 In 
April, 2007, just days before the U.S. announcement of a WTO case, 
China once again issued a judicial interpretation lowering its criminal 
                                                                                                             
viewed must answer these questions before a review meeting. There may be follow-up 
questions and replies during a review meeting. A review of China’s legislation was initi-
ated at the September 17–19, 2002 TRIPS Council meeting. See Council for TRIPS, Re-
view of Legislation, IP/Q/CHN/1, IP/Q2/CHN/1, IP/Q3/CHN/1, IP/Q4/CHN/1 (Dec. 10, 
2002). 
 103. Council for TRIPS, Checklist of Issues on Enforcement, IP/C/5 (Nov. 30, 1995). 
China’s responses to this checklist were made available on July 19, 2002. See Council for 
TRIPS, Checklist of Issues on Enforcement, IP/N/6/CHN/1 (July 19, 2002). 
 104. The TRIPS Council is required to conduct annual reviews of China’s implementa-
tion of TRIPS for eight years following accession. Accession, supra note 88, pt. I, § 
18(4). 
 105. See Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 8; Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright En-
forcement in China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 665, 673 (2006). 
 106. See Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 8; Slate, supra note 105, at 673. 
 107. See Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Pro-
curatorate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases 
of Infringing Intellectual Property (effective Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.ipr. 
gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2038&col_no=121&dir=200603. See also Slate, 
supra note 105, at 674 (“[T]he judicial interpretation . . . significantly lowered the thresh-
old for criminal piracy in some areas and made limited overall improvements to the 
criminal law.”). 
 108. See USTR, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 18, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ 
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_ 
file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter 2006 SPECIAL REPORT] (“[T]he United States has con-
cluded that China’s high thresholds for criminal liability (i.e., the minimum values or 
volumes required to initiate criminal prosecution) continue to be a major reason for the 
lack of an effective criminal deterrent. The partial reforms reflected in the December 
2004 measure did not go far enough; the mandated thresholds remain so high that they 
make it impossible as a matter of law to prosecute many commercial infringers, espe-
cially at the retail level.”). 
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threshold levels.109 The USTR dismissed this measure, stating that 
“China recently announced it has dropped its quantity threshold from 
1000 to 500 . . . but the reduced threshold still creates a major safe harbor 
problem. The thresholds are so high that they appear to permit pirates 
and counterfeiters to operate on a commercial scale.”110 
Even if China were to further amend its IPR criminal law, China would 
still face criticism that it does not take enough action to stop illegal and 
infringing activity. According to one SIPO spokesman, bribery of local 
officials is often required to investigate infringements.111 In cases that do 
receive consideration, China chooses to rely on “toothless administrative 
enforcement,” rather than turn the cases over to police.112 As a result, 
“infringers continue to consider administrative seizures and fines as a 
cost of doing business.”113 Because of these practices, less than one per-
cent of copyright and trademark cases are criminally investigated.114 The 
piracy rate for copyright-related products in China remains around ninety 
percent.115 One may argue that these figures indicate China’s lack of IPR 
enforcement in criminal cases is beyond any discretionary limits, and 
amounts to a lack of “effective action” under Article 41(1).116 This argu-
ment only begs the question: how much enforcement constitutes “effec-
tive action”? 
                                                                                                             
 109. See Intellectual Property Protection in China, New Interpretation Issued to En-
hance Criminal Protection of IP, http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no= 
67882&col_no=934&dir=200704 (“On April 5, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) promulgated the ‘Interpretation on Several 
Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases of Intellectual Prop-
erty Infringement (II)’ . . . which functions as a supplement to the previous interpretation 
adopted in 2004 . . . .”). 
 110. Request for Consultations, supra note 8. 
 111. Jason Subler, China White Paper Defends IPR Progress But Admits ‘Serious’ 
Infringements Remain, INT’L TRADE REP., vol. 22 No. 17, Apr. 28, 2005 (referring to 
comments made by Zhang Qin, spokesman for SIPO). 
 112. 2006 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 18. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 17. 
 115. 2007 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18 (“[O]verall piracy and counterfeiting 
levels remained unacceptably high in 2006. The U.S. copyright industries estimate that 
85 percent to 93 percent of all copyrighted material sold in China were pirated, indicating 
little or no improvement over 2005.”). 
 116. See Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 9 (“With intellectual property infringe-
ment in China being ‘open and notorious,’ it would seem that the present enforcement 
system broadly fails this Article 41 standard.”) (footnote omitted). 
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C. The Chinese Judicial System 
China has a four-tiered court system with the Supreme People’s Court 
at the highest level, followed by the Higher People’s Courts, Intermedi-
ate People’s Courts, and Basic People’s Courts.117 In 1993, the govern-
ment created IPR tribunals in Beijing’s Intermediate and Higher People’s 
Courts, and in 1996, an IPR tribunal was established in the Supreme 
People’s Court.118 There are also other “grass roots” IPR courts being 
formed outside Beijing.119 The Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s 
Court IPR Tribunal has created a Web site where he posts various news 
about IPR enforcement in China.120 Although TRIPS does not require 
any special courts for intellectual property cases,121 China’s initiatives 
demonstrate an added commitment to civil IPR enforcement. For China’s 
new courts to provide effective IPR enforcement, however, China must 
also commit to reforming judicial culture. 
Certain cultural features prevent impartial judicial decision-making in 
China. For example, formal legal processes are often foregone in favor of 
guanxi, or “informal relationships.”122 In Chinese society, guanxi is an 
important means for regulating social, economic, and political func-
tions,123 but in the judicial system the practice has resulted in widespread 
corruption.124 The use of personal connections has inevitably led to brib-
ery of judges.125 Local protectionism is another pervasive problem in 
China’s judicial system.126 Judges are subject to removal by the local 
people’s congresses, which creates political pressure to rule in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 117. PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL 
LEGAL CULTURE 26 (2001). 
 118. Slate, supra note 105, at 679–680. 
 119. Id. at 680. 
 120. Id. at 687. The Chinese version of the Web site is available at http://www.china 
iprlaw.cn. The English version is available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/ 
default.htm. However, the English version does not appear to have been updated since 
2005. 
 121. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 122. POTTER, supra note 117, at 30. 
 123. Id. at 12–13. 
 124. Id. at 30. See also Peerenboom, supra note 20, at 227 (“In other countries, courts 
usually serve as one of the main ways to attack corruption. However, the low stature of 
the PRC courts, and their dependence on local governments for funding make them 
unlikely candidates to hold the line against corruption . . . . Moreover, the judiciary itself 
has been plagued by corruption.”). 
 125. Id. at 31. 
 126. Peerenboom, supra note 20, at 194–195 (“By far the most prevalent source of 
external interference in the judicial process is not the CCP but local government offi-
cials.”). 
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local agencies and businesses.127 Furthermore, the Chinese legal philoso-
phy of instrumentalism regards law as a tool for implementing policy.128 
As such, the government produces broadly worded laws that allow local 
judges to rule with great discretion and no real consistency.129 
China’s judicial weaknesses are due in part to the structure of the Chi-
nese government. The 1982 Constitution (amended in 2004) gives a tex-
tual commitment to an independent judiciary,130 but the practical opera-
tion of the government precludes any true independence.131 Further, vest-
ing more power in the judiciary, such as the power “to interpret the Con-
stitution,” is implicitly prohibited by the Constitution.132 Thus, while 
China’s economic transformation has been a driving force behind legal 
reform,133 China’s judicial system remains a legacy of the old command 
economy model.134 The judiciary remains under the strict control of the 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 195. 
 128. POTTER, supra note 117, at 10. 
 129. Id. at 11. 
 130. Article 126 states “The people’s courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise 
judicial power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, 
public organizations or individuals.” XIAN FA art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (the 1982 Constitution 
was amended in 2004 for the fourth time). 
 131. See M. Ulric Killion, China’s Amended Constitution: Quest for Liberty and Inde-
pendent Judicial Review, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 43, 74–77 (2005) (describing 
how the Chinese Communist Party’s supremacy restricts the development of independent 
judicial review); Peerenboom, supra note 20, 214–215 (arguing that courts are beholden 
to the local people’s congresses and are deferent to adjudication committees on contro-
versial cases); Nanping Liu, A Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil Judgments in China, 
13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 77–78 (1999) [hereinafter Nanping Liu, A Vulnerable Justice] 
(noting that the People’s Procuratorate may protest court decisions and order a retrial). 
 132. The enumerated powers of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress include the power “[t]o interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforce-
ment” and “[t]o interpret statutes.” XIAN FA art. 67, §§ 1, 4. The positive grant of power 
to the Standing Committee under Articles 67(1) and 67(4) of the Constitution has nega-
tive implications for the power of the judiciary. See Killion, supra note 131, at 70 (“Ex-
panding Chinese courts’ power of judicial review to include the power to interpret the 
Constitution and laws of China . . . directly contravenes articles 67(1) and 67(4) of the 
1982 Constitution . . . .”). 
 133. Yu, Post-WTO China, supra note 13, at 914–918. Yu argues that the development 
and transformation of intellectual property law in China was at least in part organic. The 
millennium amendments to the Chinese copyright, trademark, and patent laws were as 
much a response to internal market stimuli as conforming to WTO standards. Id. 
 134. See Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 14 (1998) (“[T]here is no clear separation of powers in China—only a 
separation of functions. There cannot be, therefore, an independent judiciary. This is en-
trenched in the provisions of the new (1982) Constitution.”). 
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Chinese Communist Party.135 There has been some decentralization of 
control within the party,136 but this apportioning of political power has 
only contributed to local protectionism.137 In the context of IPR protec-
tion, this problem is acute where “Chinese provincial authorities, ‘far 
away over the mountains,’ benefit financially or politically from the pro-
ceeds of piracy or, instead, turn a blind eye to powerful local interests 
that do.”138 
There is no comprehensive and searchable system for reporting judicial 
decisions in China.139 The Supreme People’s Court publishes the Gazette 
of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, but it 
only contains selected and highly edited cases.140 Lower court decisions 
may appear in the Gazette, but they are subject to revision by the high 
court.141 The scarcity of published decisions in part reflects the fact that 
                                                                                                             
 135. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 394–395 (2000) (“Courts are still expected to follow policy 
as it is articulated by the CCP.”). 
 136. Id. at 385. 
 137. Id. at 395. 
 138. Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 232–233 (2006) 
(“[P]iracy in China is no longer primarily the result of the Beijing government’s own 
actions. Rather, the major continuing issue has been Beijing’s failure to get its laws and 
international obligations adequately and effectively enforced.”). 
 139. Benjamin Liebman, China’s Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257, 289 (2007) 
(“There is no formal system for publication of cases in China, nor is there a mechanism 
for searching the cases that are made publicly available.”). 
 140. Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Impli-
cations, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 360 (2004) (“Since 1985, the SPC has . . . 
published its decisions, or selected and revised versions of lower court decisions . . . .”); 
Brent T. Yonehara, Comment, Enter the Dragon: China’s WTO Accession, Film Piracy 
and Prospects for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389, 409 
(2002) (“[T]he only opinions published are those that the Supreme People’s Court deems 
relevant, and there is no precise standard to determine which opinion is deemed a rele-
vant case for publication.”); Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents” with Chinese Characteris-
tics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107, 
115–116 (1991) [hereinafter Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents”] (“The Court does not 
simply publish verbatim what it regards as the important opinions of lower courts. In-
stead, the Court, after selecting desirable cases, will substantially edit or rewrite most of 
the selected cases in order to make them understood and followed the way the Court 
wants.”). The Supreme People’s Court maintains a Web site that posts cases published in 
the Gazette, which is available at http://www.court.gov.cn. 
 141. Halverson, supra note 140, at 360; Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents”, supra note 
140, at 115 (“Most of the cases reported in the Gazette are from decisions of lower 
courts, which reach the Supreme Court through ‘the internal reporting channel.’”). 
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the Chinese legal system does not recognize cases as a source of law.142 
Many legal scholars on China’s judiciary, however, believe that cases 
should be treated as authoritative.143 Some progressive Chinese judges 
are taking the initiative to bind themselves to higher court decisions.144 
But, regardless of whether cases serve as precedent, judicial opinions 
offer guidance on how the courts are applying the law.145 To the extent 
that certain Chinese judicial decisions indicate the way in which courts 
might rule in the future, it would be useful for litigants to have access to 
such decisions.146 Furthermore, public access to judicial decisions could 
help elevate the level of judicial ethics.147 
                                                                                                             
 142. See Lin, supra note 63, at 309 (“[O]ne must bear in mind that the [sic] China has 
followed a continental legal system model in which court decisions did not have binding 
precedential value.”). 
 143. See Liebman, supra note 139, at 289 (“China is officially a civil law system and 
does not formally recognize court precedent as such. As with other civil law systems, 
however, written cases and formal guidance from higher courts do play an important 
role.”) (footnote omitted); Lin, supra note 63, at 300 (“The latest round of debate within 
the Chinese legal community indicates that there is now a general consensus that at least 
some court decisions should be treated as binding precedents for lower courts.”); Peter K. 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 220, n.446 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, China in the 
Twenty-First Century] (“The fact seems to be that Chinese court decisions have elements 
of both common-law and civil law. When the author raised that point with President [of 
the Supreme People’s Court of China] Ren Jianxin and asked which he thought domi-
nated, President Ren’s answer in reflection was—‘Neither, it is Chinese law with Chinese 
characteristics.’ And so it is; but nevertheless those ‘Chinese characteristics’ seem to 
carry with them decisions which have de facto binding and precedential effect.”) (quoting 
RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 82 (1997)). Cf. Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents”, supra note 
140, at 117 (“[A]n intentional vagueness has been injected into the force of published 
cases in the Gazette due to the statement [by the Court’s spokesman] that reported cases 
are intended ‘to provide guidance to lower courts.’”). 
 144. See Lin, supra note 63, at 300–303. 
 145. Eu Jin Chua, The Law of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction for 
International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 133, 136 (2006) (“Although there is no system 
of binding case precedent in China, such written decisions can at least provide guidance 
to the public and legal practitioners.”). 
 146. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT–THE 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK 
ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 640–642 (2004) [hereinafter RESOURCE BOOK] (“[J]udicial 
decisions are an important indication of the approach a society takes toward the protec-
tion of IP and the extent to which rights holders’ interests prevail or not over the general 
interest in the availability of IPR-affected goods or services.”); Yu, China in the Twenty-
First Century, supra note 143, at 220 (“[T]he United States can encourage and assist the 
Chinese courts . . . to publish their decisions (in both English and Chinese) to guide the 
general public and foreign businesses.”). 
 147. Lin, supra note 63, at 310. 
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The courts in China have historically been held in low esteem.148 Nev-
ertheless, Chinese citizens have begun to accept litigation as a viable al-
ternative for dispute settlement.149 Many foreign companies, however, 
have been reluctant to test the local system.150 In a survey of U.S. and 
British companies doing business in China, litigation was perceived as 
the least reliable way to resolve IPR disputes, as compared with consulta-
tion and commercial settlement.151 The USTR “continues to hear com-
plaints of a lack of consistent, uniform and fair enforcement of China’s 
IPR laws and regulations in the civil courts.”152 The inadequacy of 
China’s courts is a critical concern in addressing weak overall IPR en-
forcement, not only because certain types of cases, such as patent in-
fringement, must rely on civil enforcement, but also because private right 
holders must turn to civil actions in response to weak criminal enforce-
ment.153 
III. ADDRESSING ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS IN CHINA 
Even if China’s enforcement procedures meet TRIPS standards, some 
action is required to ensure more than token enforcement in practice.154 
In other words, the enforcement procedures must be enforced.155 The 
trade-based approach of TRIPS provides access to the DSB of the WTO 
to enforce IPR commitments among members.156 This was a major inno-
vation for the international protection of IPRs.157 The United States now 
seeks to enlist the coercive power of the DSB by undertaking the current 
challenge to China’s IPR enforcement in the WTO. An exploration of the 
U.S. strategy, however, reveals some limitations for TRIPS enforcement 
within the DSB framework. 
                                                                                                             
 148. Peerenboom, supra note 20, at 216. 
 149. Lubman, supra note 135, at 387. 
 150. See YANG, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 19, at 215. 
 151. Id. at 215–216. See also Chua, supra note 145, at 149 (“Given the relative uncer-
tainty of engaging the Chinese judiciary, foreign investors have sought to use arbitration 
as the preferred means of dispute resolution in China. Chinese arbitral institutions such as 
CIETAC [China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission] continue to 
display the desire to improve and provide a viable alternative to relying on the Chinese 
courts . . . .”). 
 152. 2007 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 21; 2006 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 108, 
at 21. 
 153. See 2006 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 108, at 20–21. 
 154. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 61, at 339. 
 155. Id. at 344. 
 156. See TRIPS art. 64(1). 
 157. GERVAIS, supra note 38, at 69. 
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A. The U.S. Case 
In accord with the predominant rhetoric of the USTR over the past few 
years, the first claim the United States submitted in its request for a DSB 
panel is as follows: 
[A]s a result of [China’s] thresholds . . . there are cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale in 
which China has not provided for criminal procedures and penalties . . . 
[and] cases . . . for which the remedies of imprisonment and/or mone-
tary fine sufficient to provide a deterrent are not available in China. . . . 
Furthermore, . . . as a result of the thresholds . . . China fails to ensure 
that enforcement procedures as specified in Part III of the TRIPS 
Agreement are available under its law so as to permit effective action 
against any act of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale. 
China’s measures thus appear to be inconsistent with China’s obli-
gations under Articles 61 and 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.158 
The United States also claims that “China’s measures for disposing of 
confiscated goods that infringe intellectual property rights appear to be 
inconsistent with China’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,” spe-
cifically Article 59, which is based on the principles in Article 46.159 The 
final U.S. claim is that China’s copyright law denies copyright protection 
to “works whose publication or distribution in China is prohibited,” so on 
this ground too China is in violation of Articles 41(1) and 61.160 Two of 
these three claims are based on combining Article 41(1) and Article 61. 
This is the strategy most commentators anticipated161 because it takes 
into account the problems toward which the USTR has directed the most 
criticism.162 Therefore, the following analysis concentrates on the claims 
involving Articles 41(1) and 61. 
                                                                                                             
 158. Request for a Panel, supra note 73. 
 159. Id. “[C]ompetent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or 
disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in Article 46.” 
TRIPS art. 59. Under Article 46, goods are to be “disposed of outside the channels of 
commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder,” and goods 
may be destroyed “unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.” 
TRIPS art. 46. 
 160. Request for a Panel, supra note 73. 
 161. See, e.g., Yu, Post-WTO China, supra note 13, at 934; Slate, supra note 105, at 
673; Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 162. 2007 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. 
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B. What Does “Permit Effective Action” Mean? 
The possible key to achieving enforcement of China’s TRIPS enforce-
ment provisions in the pending U.S. case is the clause “Members shall 
ensure that enforcement procedures . . . are available under their law so 
as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellec-
tual property rights” in Article 41(1).163 The relationship, however, be-
tween each of the enforcement procedures in Articles 42–61 and the 
words “permit effective action” is ambiguous. It is not clear whether 
“permit effective action” is a standard for evaluating members’ proce-
dures for practical compliance with the corresponding TRIPS obliga-
tions, or a requirement for administrators to exercise the enforcement 
procedures to some minimum degree.164 Thus, to determine how to apply 
Article 41(1), a DSB panel must address this inquiry: does Article 41(1) 
only require members to draft enforcement procedures that, if applied in 
any cases of infringement, would produce effective results, or to actually 
apply their enforcement procedures in cases of infringement so that acts 
of infringement are, in sum, effectively addressed, or both; and, in either 
case, what criteria are necessary to prove a member’s failure to permit 
effective action? 
One scholar suggests that Article 41(1) allows for facial challenges to 
members’ laws and a somewhat broader category of challenges based on 
“administrative, police, and judicial practices,” but that it is not suscepti-
ble to an interpretation that would allow general lack of enforcement 
claims.165 A requirement for members to exercise their enforcement pro-
visions to some minimum degree does seem at odds with the passive 
phrasing of “permit effective action.” But if China, for example, never 
                                                                                                             
 163. See TRIPS art. 41(1). See also Hughes Statement, supra note 13; supra Part I.B.2. 
 164. In the TRIPS enforcement cases to date, no DSB panel has had to decide how to 
interpret Article 41(1). These cases never reached a DSB panel because they were de-
cided by mutually agreed solution. See TRIPS Enforcement Cases, supra note 10. See 
also Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 6 (“[T]here is no precedent at the WTO for how 
to interpret these international treaty obligations to provide ‘effective’ enforcement pro-
cedures for intellectual property.”). 
 165. See Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 8–11. An example of a facial challenge 
is: “thresholds . . . for criminal prosecution are so high as to leave substantial amounts of 
obviously ‘commercial’ activity invulnerable to criminal prosecution, [thus] the law [is], 
on its face, incompatible with Article 61.” Id. at 8. A slightly broader challenge that 
Hughes finds permissible under Article 41(1) is to use evidence of IPR enforcement prac-
tices to demonstrate that the application of IPR law amounts to less than effective action. 
See id. at 9–10. Hughes comments that a complaint based on overall weak enforcement 
would fall under one of the currently barred categories of non-violation or situation com-
plaints. Id. at 11. Thus he assumes that a requirement to use enforcement procedures is 
not ingrained in the text of Article 41(1). 
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exercised its enforcement procedures—if the government declined to 
prosecute criminal cases, and judges and administrators ignored proper 
adjudicatory procedures—they would soon become dead letters and 
membership in TRIPS would be merely symbolic. TRIPS would be a 
more elaborate regime than its predecessors, but it would still be ineffec-
tive—a system that could compel adoption of enforcement procedures 
but could not compel their use.166 This need not be, however, as there are 
interpretive arguments a DSB panel could employ to breathe life into 
Article 41(1). 
The principle of effective interpretation, which has been applied in the 
WTO context, imparts that each TRIPS provision should be given effect 
if possible.167 In light of this principle, the phrase “permit effective ac-
tion” must mean something more than a superficial, or even evidentiary, 
test to apply to members’ enforcement procedures. The enforcement pro-
cedures have built-in standards for members’ laws to meet. For example, 
Article 61 requires remedies for criminal acts of infringement that “pro-
vide a deterrent”168 and Article 45 empowers judicial authorities to order 
civil damages “adequate to compensate” right holders.169 The words 
“permit effective action,” if intended to modify Articles 42–61, do not 
add anything to the standards contained therein. If the procedural action 
in question is to provide a deterrent, no more is gained by requiring an 
“effective” deterrent. Any remedy that is not effective would not be con-
sidered a deterrent, so the word “effective” in such an interpretation is 
merely superfluous. But a remedy that is considered a deterrent would 
not have effect if it were not applied at all. Thus, an effective interpreta-
tion would give independent force to “permit effective action” as an im-
plicit requirement to utilize the enforcement procedures. 
                                                                                                             
 166. This would be true, assuming Article 41(1) does not require application of en-
forcement procedures, unless the TRIPS Council lifted the moratorium on non-violation 
and situation complaints. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 
5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 58 (2002) (“The principle of effective interpretation or ‘l’effet 
utile’ . . . reflects the general rule of interpretation which requires that a treaty be inter-
preted to give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. For instance, one provi-
sion should not be given an interpretation that will result in nullifying the effect of an-
other provision of the same treaty.”) (quoting Panel Report, Canada–Term of Patent Pro-
tection, n.30, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000)). 
 168. TRIPS art. 61. 
 169. TRIPS art. 45. 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which has also been 
applied by DSB panels,170 guides one to interpret the provisions of an 
agreement “in their context and in the light of its objective and pur-
pose.”171 The meaning of Article 41(1) is equivocal, so it is proper to 
look to the purpose of TRIPS in the first instance.172 One statement of the 
purpose of TRIPS, and perhaps the most fundamental, is “to promote 
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”173 An 
interpretation of Article 41(1) that finds a requirement to exercise en-
forcement procedures promotes IPR protection more than an interpreta-
tion to the contrary. Also, without such a requirement, the civil proce-
dures in Articles 43–48 would be rendered inert. These articles all em-
ploy the language “the judicial authorities shall have the authority” with 
respect to ordering certain actions, for example, to produce evidence, to 
desist from infringing activity, to pay damages, and to dispose of infring-
ing goods.174 By itself, this language allows complete discretion of a 
member’s judiciary to implement TRIPS civil procedures. Without more, 
for instance, some minimum level of commitment to use these proce-
dures where appropriate, TRIPS civil procedures could not provide the 
bite so many commentators attribute to the Agreement.175 Therefore, to 
read Article 41(1) in light of the purpose of TRIPS, and to also take ac-
count of the context of Article 41(1) in relation to Articles 43–48, one 
must favor an interpretation that activates Articles 43–48. Again, such an 
interpretation would be a minimum requirement for governments to use 
their enforcement procedures. While this interpretation would provide 
                                                                                                             
 170. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, para. 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. 
Shrimp Case]. 
 171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
 172. See U.S. Shrimp Case, supra note 170, para. 114 (“Where the meaning imparted 
by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of 
the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole may usefully be sought.”). 
 173. TRIPS pmbl. 
 174. TRIPS arts. 43–48. 
 175. See, e.g., Ralph Oman, Copyright Piracy in China, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 583, 585 (2006) (“The [enforcement and dispute settlement provisions] give 
teeth, for the first time, to the settlement of IP disputes between member countries.”); 
Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 369, 375 (1998) (“[TRIPS] sets out a long list of detailed enforcement mecha-
nisms . . . [a]nd . . . it utilizes the WTO dispute resolution system, giving teeth to the 
treaty’s requirements.”); Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 
61, at 339 (“[T]he enforcement and dispute-settlement provisions of the TRIPS Agree-
ment put teeth into the pre-existing intellectual property conventions . . . .”). 
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the United States much greater latitude in challenging China’s IPR en-
forcement, it is yet to be revealed whether the DSB will interpret Article 
41(1) as such. 
C. Shortcomings of the U.S. Approach 
It does not appear that the United States is poised to urge the DSB 
panel to adopt the broad interpretation of Article 41(1) proposed above. 
Particularly, the first U.S. claim argues that “as a result of the thresholds 
. . . China fails to ensure that enforcement procedures . . . are available 
under its law so as to permit effective action” and thus “China’s meas-
ures . . . appear to be inconsistent with . . . Articles 61 and 41.1.”176 If the 
United States relies solely on these narrow arguments, it preemptively 
restricts its case’s potential. If the United States chooses to argue that 
China fails to adequately use TRIPS enforcement provisions, however, 
the DSB could determine that this failure is not a matter of compliance 
with Article 41(1), but rather a frustration of the purpose of the agree-
ment. Because such claims fall outside the category of violation com-
plaints, the DSB could not address that issue.177 This would not mean, 
however, that the DSB offers no recourse for enforcement-based claims. 
The combined power of the enforcement procedures and dispute settle-
ment mechanism is what set TRIPS apart from prior international intel-
lectual property agreements.178 That power would only be suited, how-
ever, to challenge domestic law, rather than domestic inaction.179 Indeed, 
the U.S. claims do identify the specific provisions of Chinese law in-
tended to implement the TRIPS obligations that the United States con-
                                                                                                             
 176. Request for a Panel, supra note 73. 
 177. If lack of enforcement in China only amounted to a general dissatisfaction based 
on expected TRIPS benefits, rather than a compliance problem, there would be no re-
course to the DSB. Such disappointments could only be addressed through non-violation 
and situation complaints, which are currently barred. See supra note 84 and accompany-
ing text. In China’s case, complaints based on the failure to take action may not even 
amount to a non-violation complaint, which would need to identify “the application . . . 
of any measure” that frustrated the agreement. See GATT art. XXIII(1)(b) (emphasis 
added). Complaints based on the failure to take any measures may thus only qualify un-
der the never-used category of situation complaints. See supra note 84. See also Hughes 
Statement, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that if the moratorium on non-violation and situa-
tion complaints were lifted, “the United States might be able to show that its benefits as a 
WTO Member—access to the Chinese market—have been impaired by judicial regula-
tions or practices (‘any measure’ under ‘b’) or simply by the general non-enforcement of 
IP (‘any other situation’ under ‘c’)”) (quoting GATT art. XXIII(1)). 
 178. See Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures, supra note 61, at 338–
339. 
 179. See Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
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siders unmet.180 In attacking these provisions, the United States will ver-
ify that China’s laws are in compliance with TRIPS, but it will achieve 
only nominal enforcement. 
Even if the DSB decided that the U.S. claims under Article 41(1), 
however argued, were properly before it, the standard that enforcement 
procedures “permit effective action” is extremely vague,181 which makes 
the result unpredictable. The absence of DSB interpretations regarding 
TRIPS enforcement claims makes it difficult to gauge the merits of the 
case against China. WTO members have brought over 360 cases to the 
DSB since 1995, but only four have been related to TRIPS enforce-
ment.182 The few enforcement cases to date gave no indication how the 
DSB would interpret the effective action requirement because each was 
settled before reaching a DSB panel.183 If the facts the United States pre-
sents show no intent to disregard the enforcement standard, however it is 
construed, the DSB is likely to rule in favor of China because TRIPS 
guarantees deference to the “differences in national legal systems.”184 
The standard of proof required for an Article 41(1) violation might be 
difficult to meet, except perhaps for a strictly facial challenge, because a 
complainant must “prove a negative, i.e. that there is no IP enforcement 
sufficient to ‘permit effective action’ and so as to ‘constitute a deterrent 
to further infringements.’”185 At the very least, proof that the enforce-
ment procedures are not permitting effective action seems to require 
                                                                                                             
 180. See Request for a Panel, supra 73. 
 181. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual 
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 35 (1998) (“[T]he enforcement 
provisions are crafted as broad legal standards, rather than as narrow rules, and their in-
herent ambiguity will make it harder for mediators or dispute-settlement panels to pin 
down clear-cut violations of international law.”). 
 182. Index of Disputes Issues, supra note 10. The United States was the complainant in 
each of these cases. The two cases brought most recently were against Greece and the 
European Communities for the same claim related to broadcasting copyrighted motion 
pictures and television programs in Greece. Id. 
 183. See TRIPS Enforcement Cases, supra note 10. 
 184. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 181, at 35–36 (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement 
expressly mandates respect for . . . ‘differences in national legal systems.’ These differ-
ences, coupled with the ambiguities of the procedural standards as drafted, invite deci-
sion-makers to take local circumstances into account when seeking to evaluate actual or 
potential conflicts between states. . . . In close cases, countries may claim that the weak 
level of enforcement meted out to a particular subject matter stems from doubts about the 
requisite scope of protection required under the substantive standards, and not from cul-
pable laxity in applying the enforcement procedures as such.”) (quoting the TRIPS Pre-
amble) (footnote omitted). 
 185. Hughes Statement, supra note 13, at 12. 
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broad evidence of inadequate enforcement.186 The dispute settlement 
mechanism was not intended to be a forum for members to bring indi-
vidual claims for their citizens. One commentator compares the Appel-
late Body of the DSB to the U.S. Supreme Court in that neither is de-
signed to resolve the multitude of infractions occurring within its juris-
diction.187 Although this analogy is not perfect, it exemplifies the type of 
role the DSB is meant to serve. The DSB would likely not be persuaded 
by a claim asserting a lack of “effective” enforcement based on a single 
incident, or even several incidents. Furthermore, members are expected 
to use judgment and exercise self-restraint when considering a case be-
fore the DSB,188 which may suggest a duty to gather compelling evi-
dence. 
In October 2005, the USTR requested information from China pursu-
ant to Article 63(3) on certain enforcement statistics.189 Article 63(3) al-
lows a member to obtain information regarding particular judicial deci-
sions or administrative rulings.190 The USTR request appeared to be an 
attempt to gather evidence for a potential complaint, which was ap-
plauded by U.S. industry as a critical first step to attacking copyright pi-
racy in China.191 China, however, asserted there was no legal basis for 
the U.S. request and refused to provide any information.192 Under Article 
63(3), members may only request information related to “specific” cases 
and rulings in which they have an interest.193 Thus, because the U.S. re-
                                                                                                             
 186. If an implementing domestic law complied with the corresponding TRIPS provi-
sion on its face, then it is logical that some significant amount of evidence would be re-
quired to show the law was not permitting effective action. 
 187. Abbott, Toward a New Era, supra note 28, at 84. 
 188. YANG, MERCURIO & LI, supra note 68, at 25–26. 
 189. USTR, Clarifications Requested by the United States Concerning IPR Enforce-
ment in Specific Cases in China (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ 
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/asset_upload_file115_8232.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Request Letter] (signed by Peter F. Allgeier, Ambassador). 
 190. TRIPS art. 63(3). A member must have “reason to believe that a specific judicial 
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quest was very broad,194 China’s denial of information may have been 
justified. 
Given China’s defiant attitude toward such requests, the United States, 
now looking to present evidence to the DSB panel, may have to identify 
many cases of weak enforcement practices in which it had an interest in 
order to make requests for information under Article 63(3) that China 
will comply with. This could prove a daunting task and impede the abil-
ity of the United States to prove its claims. If China remained unrespon-
sive to Article 63(3) requests, the United States could initiate a case 
against China for failure to comply with Article 63(3), but this would 
greatly delay any decision in the current U.S. case. 
The theme of deference to national implementation of TRIPS standards 
stated in the agreement’s preamble and somewhat more specifically ren-
dered in Article 41(5) also poses an obstacle to the U.S. case. “[Part III] 
does not . . . affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in gen-
eral. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distri-
bution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the enforcement of law in general.”195 With respect to criminal 
enforcement under Article 61, this deference seems to allow China com-
plete discretion to prosecute cases of willful counterfeiting and piracy. 
Another limiting factor for the U.S. case is that it focuses primarily on 
lack of criminal enforcement in China, with the exception of the claim 
relating to disposal of infringing goods, which targets customs prac-
tices.196 Even a successful action under Article 61 would not provide a 
complete solution to inadequate enforcement. Criminal prosecution is 
only required for certain cases of trademark and copyright misappropria-
tion—the most “blatant and egregious forms of infringing activity.”197 In 
all other cases, private right owners must rely entirely on civil procedures 
to obtain remedies for infringement. As noted above, China has focused 
attention on the courts for settling IPR disputes.198 In light of the short-
comings of China’s judicial system—corruption, local protectionism, and 
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political control199—the United States could potentially bring a complaint 
against China under one of Articles 42–49, relating to civil procedures.200 
Either Article 41(1) or Article 41(2), which requires procedures to be 
“fair and equitable,”201 might be used in combination with any of Articles 
42–49 to challenge compliance of civil proceedings in China with TRIPS 
standards. 
Any potential complaint involving the inadequacy of civil judicial en-
forcement, however, is also limited by Article 41(5), which states: “[Part 
III] does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the en-
forcement of law in general . . . .”202 The agreement was intended to cre-
ate standards that the varied judicial systems of the world could meet.203 
Thus, a DSB panel might be reluctant to condemn any specific proce-
dures China has implemented with respect to its obligations under TRIPS 
civil procedure provisions. 
IV. IMPROVING TRIPS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 
As discussed above, there are several obstacles to a successful WTO 
complaint based on Article 41(1) and any of the TRIPS enforcement pro-
cedures in Articles 42–61: a complaint alleging the failure to use TRIPS 
enforcement procedures to some minimum degree might be characterized 
as a non-violation or situation complaint, the vague standard of “effec-
tive action” makes the outcome of a DSB ruling uncertain, proving a lack 
of “effective action” seems to require gathering broad evidence (in either 
a case targeting a member’s IPR enforcement practices or a member’s 
lack of action to enforce its IPR enforcement laws), and TRIPS respects 
members’ allocation of prosecutorial resources and existing judicial sys-
tems based on Article 41(5).204 A solution for improving IPR enforce-
ment in China must circumvent these limitations. 
A. A Path to Better Enforcement 
The United States should consider a WTO case against China under 
Article 63(1) based on China’s failure to meet the judicial decisions pub-
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lishing requirement. If a DSB panel found that China was not in compli-
ance with Article 63(1), and China remedied its violation of that provi-
sion, mere compliance with the procedural publication requirement 
would have its own substantive effects that would lead to better en-
forcement. 
As mentioned above, market forces helped propel China’s legal re-
form.205 Those same forces would impel change in the judicial system if 
more information were available in the judicial information market-
place.206 A successful challenge to China’s judiciary under Article 63(1) 
transparency would produce better knowledge of how judges are apply-
ing the law, and would possibly identify when corruption and political 
influence have been determinative in particular cases.207 As one com-
mentator asserted, “sunlight is the best disinfectant.”208 In such an envi-
ronment, more businesses would be likely to pursue a remedy in court 
for alleged infringements.209 With improved transparency, increased 
challenges in China’s courts would exert upward pressure on the political 
powers to reform the operation of the judicial system to adapt to the 
needs of litigants.210 
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The success of a challenge under Article 63(1) depends on the level of 
judicial transparency it requires, as determined by a DSB interpretation, 
and whether China’s judicial system meets this level. 
B. Interpretation of Article 63(1) 
Article 63(1) limits the judicial publishing requirement to “final” deci-
sions.211 Based on its plain meaning, a “final” decision is one that is ei-
ther issued by the highest court, or not subject to further appeal.212 Al-
though the definition of a final decision may seem clear, it may become 
more complicated in application to the relevant legal system.213 In China, 
the finality of any judicial decision is debated because different branches 
of government may reexamine cases almost ad infinitum.214 For Article 
63(1) to have any effect in China, however, some level of judicial deci-
sion-making must be deemed to produce a “final decision.”215 
One commentator has proposed two different methods of imposing “fi-
nality” on Chinese court decisions for international legal purposes.216 The 
first method is to allow China to determine which decisions are “legally 
effective,” and to declare these decisions final.217 Although this approach 
is flexible, and may be contoured to the Chinese judicial system, its ap-
plication would be complex.218 Furthermore, in the case of a publishing 
requirement, this discretionary approach would allow China to unduly 
restrict publication. A second method is to simply determine a level of 
“artificial” finality, for example by declaring that decisions of the Su-
preme People’s Court are final.219 This approach seems more reasonable, 
as it assures a uniform rule for publication, and does not allow for inter-
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ference with the rule once it is established. In a WTO case, the DSB 
could simply determine this artificial level of finality based on the spe-
cific structure of the Chinese judicial system. Decisions in any IPR cases 
that have reached the Supreme People’s Court and decisions by any IPR 
tribunal that may no longer be appealed to another court should be 
deemed “final,” and should therefore be published. 
Another issue with interpreting the publishing requirement is what con-
tent published judicial decisions must provide. Article 41(3) says deci-
sions “shall preferably be in writing and reasoned,”220 but these should be 
seen as more than just preferences. If decisions are to be published, this 
assumes they must be in writing. There also should be some reasoning 
provided in a written decision, because a decision without any reasoning 
is not useful even if it is published. One Shanghai court has taken the 
radical step of providing detailed reasoning in its opinions, including dis-
senting opinions.221 In reference to the rationale behind this bold step, 
one commentator stated that “allowing the public to see how a court 
reaches its decision ultimately results in greater fairness of the judicial 
process and increases the public’s trust in the system.”222 This judicial 
ethic could be adopted by a DSB panel in its interpretation of Article 
63(1), which in turn would spread the practice of writing reasoned, pub-
lished opinions throughout China’s courts. 
C. Practical Application of Article 63(1) and Implications of a Transpar-
ency Approach 
China does not meet the Article 63(1) transparency requirement for 
publishing judicial decisions, based on the reasonable interpretation of 
Article 63(1) presented above. The selective publishing of some deci-
sions does not satisfy the imperative language in Article 63(1) that judi-
cial decisions “shall be published.”223 Furthermore, the editing of lower 
court decisions disregards the essential purpose of publishing judicial 
decisions—to inform private right holders how the courts are applying 
the law.224 The Chinese judicial system, although not truly independent, 
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has the capability to implement a DSB decision requiring a system for 
reporting judicial decisions. In 2002, the Supreme People’s Court issued 
two judicial interpretations: Provisions on Certain Issues Related to 
Hearing of International Trade Administration Cases and Provisions on 
the Jurisdictional Matters Concerning Foreign-Related Civil and Com-
mercial Disputes.225 These interpretations demonstrate the Court’s au-
thority to promulgate rules and its willingness to adopt WTO-promoted 
international norms. 
A case under Article 63(1) avoids the problems inherent in a case un-
der Article 41(1) in combination with an enforcement procedure. The 
United States would directly challenge China’s compliance with a spe-
cific provision, which meets the definition of a violation complaint and is 
within the competence of the DSB for disputes arising under TRIPS.226 
The requirement for judicial transparency is a rule, rather than a vague 
standard, and thus should be easier to apply. There is no extensive 
amount of evidence to gather in a complaint under Article 63(1)—all that 
is required is a comparison of China’s efforts at a judicial publication 
system (primarily the Gazette) with what constitutes a proper Article 
63(1) publishing system. A requirement to publish judicial decisions 
does not interfere with China’s prerogative to choose the best way to im-
plement TRIPS standards.227 Transparency does not dictate what the law 
should be, just that it be known. The procedural requirement in Article 
63(1) to publish judicial decisions does not violate the principle in Arti-
cle 41(5) that members shall not be required to adopt a distinct judicial 
system under the agreement.228 If Article 63(1) and Article 41(5) are to 
be read as consistent with each other,229 judicial transparency cannot be 
interpreted to impose any offensive structural changes on the judicial 
system. In addition, a DSB panel would be likely to look favorably upon 
a transparency claim, given the fundamental importance of transparency 
within the WTO system.230 
This transparency solution does not provide the immediate and direct 
results that a heavy-handed, top-down approach might achieve. It is an 
indirect and long-term solution that can stimulate organic changes in 
China’s judiciary, a feature absent in an administrative decree or tempo-
rary crackdown on infringement. Unfortunately, this transparency strat-
egy may prove to be a difficult sell to the USTR. It is not nearly as at-
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tractive as a complaint that could get China to take action by increasing 
criminal prosecutions. The USTR, however, should see increased judicial 
transparency as another way to foster U.S. investment opportunities. Pri-
vate investors are eager to engage in China’s markets.231 In the absence 
of full transparency, investors are deterred because they overestimate 
legal risks.232 Greater transparency would increase private investment in 
China, and industry leaders in the United States should make this argu-
ment to persuade the USTR to clear the way for safe investments in 
China through increased judicial transparency. 
CONCLUSION 
Although still considered a developing country, China represents the 
largest potential market in the WTO.233 Therefore, inadequate IPR en-
forcement in China has a large impact on the United States and other de-
veloped countries. Not only does weak IPR enforcement negatively af-
fect private investment decisions and the level of success of any such 
investments, but it has broader implications for the trade relationship be-
tween the United States and China.234 Greater IPR protection would help 
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balance trade between the United States and China.235 Thus, the state of 
IPR protection is a primary concern for U.S. economic policy-makers. 
Compliance with TRIPS should also be a primary concern for Chinese 
policy-makers because it offers the opportunity for China to become a 
mature technology-economy through technology transfer. China has al-
ready made great strides in revising its IPR laws and in establishing spe-
cialized courts; however, cultural practices remain a hindrance to IPR 
enforcement. Although TRIPS is just one instrument with which to exert 
pressure on China to improve enforcement practices, it has the potential 
to be the most far-reaching. 
If the United States initiated a case against China in the DSB to in-
crease judicial transparency based on Article 63(1) of TRIPS, private 
litigants would have a more predictable atmosphere in which to enforce 
their rights. This would be an incremental step in judicial reform, with 
broader implications of helping to create a more independent judiciary. 
The risk of not having a transparent and independent judicial system is 
losing the confidence of foreign investors, an outcome that would reduce 
technology-based investments and stall China’s economic progress. A 
reasonable interpretation of Article 63(1) that requires China to imple-
ment a transparent and informative judicial reporting system, and com-
pliance by China, would encourage investors and promote technology 
transfer. TRIPS is described as a set of minimum standards for IPR pro-
tection, and China offers a test case to determine whether these minimum 
standards will be met by more than minimum enforcement. 
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